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society, as we understand it, and as it has been understood hitherto, exist at all?

Whether we are right or wrong in our apprehensions, this present is certainly no time for able-minded and well-trained men to "sit apart," in a state of milk-and-water Wertherism, minus the pistol, dreaming of a millennium with picturesque costumes; no time for the "Kings of Modern Thought" to be "dumb." If they are really kings and not pretenders, they will have clear and settled opinions, and will urge them with voice and pen, manfully and mightily. It is pitiable to sing of

"Wandering between two worlds; one dead,
The other powerless to be born,"

when any one can see that the new world is upon us; when there is a chance that a communistic cataclysm may sweep us all away before it, and reduce this new world to a form of society in which the best man, if any of that sort should escape the flood, could only, to use the most expressive and significant of modern slang phrases, do his level best,—a dead level of mediocrity, stagnation, darkness, death.

FREDERICK SHELDON.

ART. IV. — *History of Civilization in England and France, Spain and Scotland.* By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. New Edition. London: Longmans & Co.

To understand Mr. Buckle, it is necessary, in the first place, to understand his problem,—the problem, namely, towards which, with more or less consciousness, he, on the whole, strove. But this, so far as *definiteness* is concerned, we must make out pretty much for ourselves. Mr. Buckle does not generally care to prescind matters. It is his nature rather to affect the circumlocutory and vague. He leaves, for the most part, *articulation* to his reader, satisfied himself that he has supplied sound enough. But such articulation is not always easy. It is a feat generally, if out of the chaffy masses of that enormous declamation, and not simply borne away by the mere volume and roll of it, we pick up and put together a grain now

and a grain again. So it is, on the whole, with Mr. Buckle's problem: only to express effort will it definitely yield itself.

The generation to which we owe the production of Mr. Buckle was that under which the *Aufklärung* was stifled for a time; for, while Scott and Wordsworth, and even Carlyle reigned, the previous Humian negative was rebuked, and there was an affirmative fostered, if only of the imagination. The *Aufklärung*, naturally, could but ill brook such check. It sulked at it. It frowned upon the themes these men — Scott, Coleridge, Southey, all the rest of them — chose. It horribly hated the opinions they countenanced, and as horribly their *style*! It thought of Pope and Hume and Goldsmith in comparison, and longed unceasingly for those purer tastes and bolder spirits who would write again what could be read, and call again "the lie" a lie. In short, the *Aufklärung* pined under its own *pang*, — the pang at all that was received, the pang at the denial of its own. All this we can see in Messrs. Grote and Bain, and very specially in Mr. Mill, to whom, too, the generation of growth was that that witnessed the triumph of the modern imaginative literature, — a literature which, as a reaction from the negative of scepticism to the affirmative of faith, mortified all men of the *understanding*, and of the taste of the understanding, and drove them into the revolt which has been named the Revulsion. It was among such men, and as such a man himself, that Mr. Buckle was bred.

But he was evidently born withal with the dream in him of literary glory. While it would be his, he vowed, to supplant cowardice again and restore boldness, it would be his also, he felt, to found an era. How, of course, could not at once manifest itself to him; but this was clear to him from the first: "It seems desirable that something should be done on a scale far larger than has hitherto been attempted." *Something* should be done, and on a scale far larger than has hitherto been attempted!

There should be return, then, to the freer spirit of the nobler era. There should be retribution and rehabilitation for all the wronged great ones whom it had been the fashion to forget or the fashion to decry. Voltaire should come to his own again. Supported on the solidity of science, the certain facts

of history, the demonstrations of political economy, there should again be heard the stately sneer of Gibbon to cause instantly to vanish all those insolent faiths of all those contemptible recent poets, with their broken lines and obscure, perhaps ungrammatical, rhapsodies! The harmonious numbers of Pope, the "spotless style of Hume," Diderot, and D'Alembert, and *écrasons l'infame*, — these should be the words again!

But above all, it was Bacon and Adam Smith that wooed for themselves the soul of Mr. Buckle. The former had exorcised the false, and established the true principles of the knowledge of nature; and the latter had exorcised the false, and established the true principles of the manipulation of nature. Ah! these were great achievements. But could no more be done? Had they "covered the whole field," these men? Was it impossible to continue their principles, to extend their principles, to complete their principles? Was there no possibility of a generalization ultimate, — a generalization that would transcend and subserve theirs; that would reduce all, even perhaps gravitation itself, into a high and higher unity; that would bring a controlling sovereign to the giants themselves? Here was an entrancing thought to fill the big bosom of the young Buckle bigger!

What had they done, then, — Bacon and Adam Smith, — and what had they left undone?

Theology and metaphysics (Bacon's logic is but our metaphysics) had rather dreamed and fabled than explained and interpreted nature; but Bacon had exorcised these, — exorcised and put to flight all the theological nightmares and metaphysical cobwebs that had deformed and distorted nature.

And Adam Smith, he, too, had acted similarly, — similarly in regard to the manipulation of nature. He had exorcised the evil spirit of Protection that had hitherto paralyzed it.

Bacon, further, had led us up to the true principle of the observation of the actual fact of nature, and of the application and utilization of it through the method of induction.

While Adam Smith, again, had led us up to the true principle of the observation of self-interest, and of the application and utilization of it through the method of deduction.

Exorcism, principle, method ; must these stop there ? Was there no possibility of carrying them further ?

In the first place, were they wholly disjunct, then, — these two men ? Was there no connection between them, no community of work ? Why, was it not evident at once that the manipulation of nature was but the intermediation of nature with — Man ?

In the second place, was not that the element precisely necessary to “cover the whole field” ? Was there more in this world than nature and mind, together with the manipulation of both into productiveness ?

And, in the third place, might not this one failing element — and its manipulation as well — be subjected to the same principles to which Bacon and Adam Smith had subjected the other ?

Nay, was not mind higher than nature, — the internal more than the external ? Might not he, then, who brought in *it*, aspire to a higher praise than he who brought in nature ; and he who brought in the manipulation of *it*, aspire to a higher praise than he who brought in the manipulation of nature ? Ah, but more, a thousand times more even than that, might not he who alone was for mind and the manipulation of mind what it had taken *both* (Bacon and Smith) to be for nature and the manipulation of nature, — might not he, thus already transcendently great, aspire to the yet greater greatness of combining all — nature and the manipulation of nature, mind and the manipulation of mind — into a single principle, a single generalization ? What dreams were here ! Why, the spot the highest in the universe was still left vacant, virgin for the gigantic tread of Buckle ! Here, both theoretically and practically, — here were consummation. *Finis*, at last ! Bacon brought in nature, and Smith the manipulation of nature ; but Buckle — Buckle it would be said — brought in mind, Buckle brought in the manipulation of mind, Buckle brought in and united all ! The Wealth of Nations was much, but what were a Wisdom of Nations ?

When young ambition, in flash of its own genius, suddenly catches sight of such pinnacle as this, an ecstasy may be understood to ensue to which for intensity no earthly joy can

approach ; but, alas ! the dejection of the reaction, the dejection of the necessary failure ! And that Mr. Buckle had tasted to the full the extreme of either feeling we are left at no loss to gather from his own words. Even in his opening chapter, after having done full justice to the grandeur of the conception that lay in him, after having enrobed it and enthroned it and canopied it with state, after having stimulated curiosity to the very verge by the splendors and the wonders of his prophecy, he confesses to despair that the execution will equal the idea. In his closing chapter, again, he sorrowfully pleads, in mitigation of every short-coming, “ the immensity of the subject, the shortness of a single life, and the imperfection of every single enterprise.” Somewhere in his second volume, too, he mentions the rapture of the early days when he had hoped to “ cover the whole field,” intimates a certain mournful sense of partial failure in — in — his comprehensiveness, and majestically forbears those small enemies whom the “ philosopher,” he says, cannot always reach to “ rebuke.”

But let us not anticipate the weariness of the end ; let us return rather, as is only proper thus far, to the alacrity of the beginning.

Mr. Buckle's mind dwelt fondly, then, there cannot be a doubt of it, on the ideas of Bacon and Adam Smith. To these two men — perhaps with the addition of Locke and Newton — he saw we owed the sober sense, the rational liberty, and the solid products which we at present enjoy. He burned to follow in their footsteps, and he was transported to find ground still unoccupied by either of them, — ground more comprehensive than theirs, which connected theirs the one with the other, and united both into its own higher and highest singleness. Here he would take stand ; here he would do for mind and the manipulation of mind what Bacon and Adam Smith had done for nature and the manipulation of nature ; here he would unite all. The demons Theology, Metaphysics, and Protection were still in that possession mentally from which they had been expelled in a natural reference. What might not mind become were it relieved of these demons, were it placed, like nature, at last, in the light of day, and were the great results obtained inductively in regard to its movements applied de-

ductively in practical utilization of its productiveness? Mental laws raised to the level of natural laws, the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge as scientifically cared for as the accumulation and diffusion of wealth; here were a prospect of man's well-being and of a commonweal at last! And why should it be despaired of? What is it that secures the success of the Baconian method in application to nature? Is it not the fact of "necessary connection" in phenomena, and their reduction so to the single law of gravitation? And what is it that secures the success of Adam Smith's principles in regard to the manipulation of nature? Is it not the application of the same fact of "necessary connection" to the movements of human cupidity, human selfishness? But if, with consequent mastery of all subordinate phenomena, the manipulation of nature be brought into the domain of necessity under the law of self-interest, in the same way as Nature herself is brought into the same domain of necessity under the law of gravitation, why should not mind be capable of being similarly reduced into a similar necessity and under a similar law? Connection, we can hear Mr. Buckle pleading, exists in the moral not less than in the physical world; for man is as much the subject of *motives* as regards his soul in the one as he is the subject of forces as regards his body in the other. If, then, the latter (forces) have been generalized and submitted to law, what grounds have we to anticipate failure in respect to the former (motives)? What reason have we not to hope as signal a success with these as with those? In short, Mr. Buckle would fain trace "necessary connection" into the moral world in all that interdependent series and conjunct system which it displays in the physical world. He, as a moral philosopher, would fain know and predict the movements of mind (man) with the same accuracy and certainty with which the natural philosopher knows and predicts the movements of nature. His creed is, "that the whole world forms a necessary chain, in which, indeed, each man may play his part, but can by no means determine what that part shall be." Into this chain he believes to fall, then, not only nature, but mind, and not only the movements of either, but the express manipulation or utilization of those of both. And thus Hume's title "Of the Idea

of Necessary Connection" might appropriately be applied, if not to the actual work, at least to the actuating will of Mr. Buckle.

This, after all, however, is very much the scope of Comte. He, too, leaving the particular, and addressing himself to the mass, would fain discover that "wide and comprehensive" generalization which should "cover the whole field." The registration and generalization—as it were from a distance, and as a whole—of all phenomena whatever, whether they were those of nature in space, or of man in time,—that was the special prescript characteristic and even constitutive of the "philosophy" he named "*positive*." That philosophy, in a word, is precisely the study of the invariable laws of phenomena; it desires to represent all phenomena as particular cases of some one general fact; and even history it regards as but the necessary result of the mutual action of the laws of nature and of the laws of man. Mr. Mill, it is true, while admitting Comte to insist on the fact of history having tendencies of its own, somewhat weakens this by his censure of Mr. Buckle in this very reference. Comte is free, he says, "from the error of those who ascribe all to general causes"; an error on the part of Mr. Buckle, he intimates, "the more to be regretted as it gives a color to the prejudice which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as identical with fatalism." It is certain, nevertheless, that Comte, in the main, does hold history to be a "reign of law"; he even makes play, in the same manner as Mr. Buckle, eliminating the weaker element before the stronger, as the æsthetic and moral, for instance, before the intellectual. Mr. Buckle, to be sure, has a consideration for political economy which M. Comte, with all his acceptance of Adam Smith, has not; but, this difference apart, it will be difficult to find any other of any consequence in the principles of both. The perception of this is, perhaps, not quite pleasant to Mr. Buckle himself; and it was this very difference possibly, as regards political economy, and the consequent glorious dream of the results of fusion between Bacon and Smith, that lifted the Englishman almost out of sight of his debts to the Frenchman.

But, be that as it may, it is certain that Mr. Buckle, in full perception of his own transcendent merits, would willingly

ignore all obligations to M. Comte that the greater may not always owe to the lesser. It is thus, for example, that, casting his large regards on the "Philosophie Positive," Mr. Buckle, with his usual majesty, speaks: "There is much in the method and in the conclusions of this great work with which I cannot agree; but it would be unjust to deny its extraordinary merits." Much "with which I cannot agree!" But "unjust to deny its extraordinary merits!" Was ever master, throughout the whole course of time, disowned by pupil with such magnificent patronage? But O those *cuisantes* words, — *cuisantes* especially to an *Aufgeklärter*, — "much with which I cannot agree"!

Be as it may with M. Comte, however, — and let us point, in passing, to Bacon as the source of his "theology and metaphysics," — we may pretermit all further consideration in his case at present, and confine ourselves to the idea (or dream) of Mr. Buckle, which, through union of Adam Smith with Bacon, would rise from nature and the manipulation of nature to mind and the manipulation of mind, if not in the end to a generalization that should contain all. This is Mr. Buckle's problem, and it is with that problem that we are at present concerned.

The problem itself, perhaps, we sufficiently see now, and we may pass to the way he would realize it.

The movements of mind are the movements of man, and where, for such distant and comprehensive generalization as we have alluded to in reference to Comte, are these movements deposited? Where is the record of them contained and preserved? Or where is the necessary registration of them to be found, — the preliminary registration, namely, that must precede the ultimate generalization of them? Why, in history.

Here, then, is our whole work shortly mapped out for us. Mr. Buckle, seeing well what has been left for him, would apply to history those methods of Bacon and Adam Smith by which they arrived, the one at a knowledge of the movements of nature, and the other at a knowledge of the manipulation of them, — to the production, as he fondly anticipates, of the higher knowledge of the movements of mind, on the one hand, and of their manipulation on the other, not without hope of the

ultimate and final result that should comprehend all, that should "cover the whole field."

This, as said, Mr. Buckle fondly anticipates. But we cannot say that, as he turns now to history, he is encouraged by what he sees. At all events he preliminarily grumbles enough, and his first approaches to his theme necessitate somehow such unsatisfactory grasping forward and again such unsatisfactory grasping backward as end only — though under the inspiring roll and rhythm ever of his mighty and sesquipedalian declamation — in a mere tangle of desultory remark. The writers of history, for example, Mr. Buckle finds to have been hitherto but poor creatures. One, he complains, is ignorant of political economy, another of law, a third of physical science, a fourth of ecclesiastical affairs, and a fifth of "the philosophy of statistics." Few or none of them, he proceeds, seem to possess "those habits of speculation which, *though liable to abuse*, are the essential condition" in such inquiries. The most celebrated of them are manifestly inferior to the most successful cultivators of physical science; and he thinks "not one of them is, in point of intellect, to be compared with Newton or Kepler." "The most accurate investigators of the human mind," Mr. Buckle declares with a well-merited lifting of the chest and corroboration of the mouth, "have hitherto been the poets, particularly Homer and Shakespeare; but these extraordinary observers mainly occupied themselves with the concrete phenomena of life, and if they analyzed, as they probably did, they have concealed the steps of the process, so that now we can only verify their conclusions empirically." Might not one linger a whole summer's day over these delicious utterances, especially over the majestic grandeur of that superb last sentence? What happiness it is for us to think that in Mr. Buckle we shall possess at last an historian who knows everything, political economy, law, physics, ecclesiastical affairs, statistics, what not, — an historian possessed of "those habits of speculation which are the essential condition!" Mr. Buckle, we are sure, is not one of those who content themselves with mere reading for what is called general information; he must have been a technical and profound student in all departments, and have approached his theme only with the

accuracy of exact science. Those habits of speculation, too, which, "though liable to abuse," etc. ! Is not the phrase as big a mouthful to us as it is to Mr. Buckle himself? and do we not shake our heads over it quite as wisely as he? Then Shakespeare and Homer! But, no! it were profanity, it were failure and folly, to enter here; only its own self can be that inimitable sentence's own adequate interpreter. Ah, what a sigh we heave, however, to think that these "extraordinary observers" "if they analyzed," "as they probably did," should "have concealed the steps of their process!" So that now "we can only verify their conclusions empirically!" In subordinating the intellects of our historians, we ought to remark here, lastly, how delightfully independent Mr. Buckle is of the fact that no two intellects that ever existed were more unlike than those of Newton and Kepler.

Even the poets, then, — to continue the representation, — will not stead us, while "historians, taken as a body, have never recognized the necessity of such a wide and preliminary study as would enable them to grasp their subject in the whole of its natural relations." But still, Mr. Buckle urges, the materials of history are abundant; it is only the use of them that is imperfect, and there is a failure to investigate them according to those "*exhaustive methods* which," etc. It must be confessed that in all this Mr. Buckle is not without something like seesaw, — a seesaw that procures emission for considerable mouthings. Thus we are led at times to believe that history is a blank, and that there is a vast work, an immense labor before Mr. Buckle in order to raise it to the general level; but if even then, — though thinking, perhaps, of Thucydides and Tacitus and Hume, and all the rest of them, and demurring to the proposition that we have had to wait all these thousand years for the unique Mr. Buckle, — if even then, we say, yielding to the irresistible flood of his eloquence, we should begin to have some conviction that "the laws of history are unknown, and even the foundation unsettled," we are sure to find ourselves brought short up by Mr. Buckle himself, avowing that from the early part of the eighteenth century there *are* historians, and that after the sixteenth, and especially during the last hundred years, there is an "increasing *comprehen-*

siveness among them." This seesaw that there is not, and yet that there is, proves puzzling. Still in a sort of involuntary, hazy reliance on the big words, and without much risk of being proved wrong, we may agree that "scarcely anything has been done towards discovering the principles which govern the character and destiny of nations," and even admit, buoyed up on the grand say-nothingness, that, as already quoted, "it seems desirable that something should be done on a scale far larger than has hitherto been attempted." We may cheerfully allow ourselves to hope, also, that Mr. Buckle may be enabled "to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the different branches of natural science," and "to contribute something towards filling up that *wide and dreary chasm* [between the two worlds physical and moral] which, *to the hinderance of our knowledge*, separates subjects that are intimately related, and *should never be disunited*." We are not quite certain, to be sure, when it is again put to us in this plain form, that it is not therefore surprising that the study of the movements of man should be still in its infancy as compared with the advanced state of the study of the movements of nature; but we wish to deal fairly, we are reminded once more of Mr. Buckle's animating idea, and we should be very glad to see the attempt, once for all, begun to demonstrate its actual existence and function as well morally as physically.

This is pretty much the import, as well of Mr. Buckle's first survey of the field he is going to appropriate, as of our feelings in regard to it. The next thing for us to see, then, is Mr. Buckle actually at work on this field. Adequately to appreciate that, however, and the chances of success, let us first consider for a moment his object itself, and the principles with which he approaches it. Or, Mr. Buckle aiming to arrive at a knowledge of, and an ability to predict, the movements of man (mind) by generalization (through induction) of the facts of history, and consequent application (through deduction) of the principles acquired, — Mr. Buckle, we say, so aiming, and with preliminary elimination of theology, metaphysics, and protection, does it lie in the nature of the case that he should succeed? The pertinence of this question will be at once per-

ceived ; for it will be perceived, also, that the preceding sentence names the whole purpose of Mr. Buckle, and in all its essential divisions.

In the first place, we must point out that the way in which Mr. Buckle sets to work gives but little hope. The scientific demand now is, that, for any intellectual work to prove satisfactory, a mass of materials must be approached by a clew such that it will effect completeness of intelligence both as regards the one of the whole and the many of the details. We see, nevertheless, no such idea in the action of Mr. Buckle. That action is but a pseudo-Gibbonian, hollow-sounding, pretentious miscellany of remark about and about the various subjects just specified, but without beginning, middle, or end. The very generalization of history even proceeds, as it were, only rhapsodically, only by happy-go-lucky handfuls.

In the second place, it is perhaps a mistake to suppose that, as the laws of nature were generalized from external phenomena with elimination of theology and metaphysics, the laws of mind are to be generalized from the phenomena of history with the same elimination. To reach his object Mr. Buckle seems to conceive that all he has to do is to examine history. But *can* history, as it exists, be regarded as an accurately complete and exhaustive registration of the facts of mind ? We will trust to the reader to reflect here. For his object, then, may not Mr. Buckle's whole action be simply a mistake ? The laws of mind being what is required, is it enough, is it necessary, to refer to the past at all ? *Ex hypothesi*, necessary nexus obtaining everywhere, what was, is, both as regards nature and as regards mind. For the movements of nature the present sufficed. Bacon did not seek these in the history of nature. But if it is enough to observe nature now, why should it not be also enough so to observe mind ? Why not place mind in the scales as we have placed nature ? In short, as natural inquirers turn to nature rather than to its history, why should not mental inquirers turn similarly to mind rather than to *its* history ? History will bring always its own light certainly, but must history — the indirect — be made all, while metaphysic — the direct — is only carefully eliminated ? History is not of much use to us towards a knowledge of anatomy ; and the study of a single

crystal suffices for the class. Why not study mind as we study these? It is there before us; it can be watched, it can be examined, it can even be submitted to experiment. Had Mr. Buckle but reflected, perhaps it would have appeared to him but a mistake to attribute in the time of Bacon the imperfection of natural to the influence of theological and metaphysical science; these were then themselves similarly imperfect; these have themselves been precisely similarly improved, and, while constituting the indispensable conditions of a knowledge of mind, they are really at this moment on quite as satisfactory a stage of advancement as the other itself!

Is it so certain, too, that you can approach the examination of mind with the same expectations with which you approach the examination of nature? Is it possible to hope that you will yet see man, like a planet, rotating on a prescribed axis, revolving in a prescribed orbit, observing prescribed times, passing over prescribed spaces, presenting generally, in short, a sublime *cursus* of regulated movement, in which neither beautiful simplicity nor yet pleasing alternation will fail? Such vast humanitarian calendar were, indeed, a desideratum; but may we hope to realize it? No, no; the two worlds are essentially distinct: the world of free will is not the world of physical necessity, and the former cannot be seduced to the modes of the latter. *Evolution* is not *revolution*.

In the third place, is it certain that, for the right application of the true principles in regulation of man, protection must be abandoned? May we not dispute this? May we not assert, on the contrary, that protection is the sole duty of government? Of government, namely, the universal is the whole concern. And the universal can never be left to the self-will of the individual. The universal of man is that he should think; the self-will of man is, in a word, that he should *feed*. Leave all, then, to the latter, and the former will disappear. Now, for some time back, through caricature of the principles of political economy at the hands of certain pedants, it is the former that has been denied, the latter alone that has been affirmed, to the result that we see now imminent, — gorilla-atonism! There is such a thing as a genuine political economy; but this must be widely discriminated from the abstract nullities of the pedants

who call themselves followers of Adam Smith and David Hume. It is a fearful thing, nowadays, to see the so-called political economy of these men usurp the place of those principles of politics which reason itself prescribes, and history, as a whole, guarantees. The commonweal shall result — shall it? — from denying all things to the universal of reason, and allowing all things to the individual of brutish self-interest!

There is here matter which we can only indicate.

What we have to reflect upon is, Mr. Buckle's so philosophical elimination of protection, and the chance in this way of success for his work. To leave the whole matter of education aside, would it be possible for us to have seen such a thing as a telescope, were all left to the brutish instincts of animal self-interest?

In the fourth place, Mr. Buckle makes great play, in his pompous, hollow way, with the contrast of induction and deduction. England is this through the one, Scotland is that through the other! The whole matter, however, is but a self-delusion, or a mere *attempt* at literary originality and point, through a contrast that will make the groundling stare. The truth of the matter is that both Hume and Adam Smith simply reasoned on the facts before them, just as Bacon did. Thought is one, not two: the only difference in its regard concerns its expression. What is the work of Smith, for example, unless a number of critical observations on the state of the case as he simply there finds it? Nor because Hume states generally his conclusions first, and then gives his reasons for them, is this a proof that his method was deductive. The question is, how did he attain to his conclusions? That both Hume and Adam Smith did approach certain subjects with preconceived opinions, or even prejudices, that warped the results, there cannot be a doubt; but their action at such times is hardly to be dignified with the name of deduction. Where Hume is valuable, whether as regards politics or metaphysics, he will be found to be simply reasoning about certain exemplars in actual fact. Observe, for instance, how it is situated with his *dictum*, "That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy." There is more of a deductive look certainly in

the manner of Adam Smith, for what he has for the most part to convey wears the character of lessons ; but these lessons are still referred to the facts from which they have been won : they are all inferences from considerations of the nature of the case. To distinguish between men and countries on any such principles as these of Mr. Buckle here smacks, in short, of the pretentious mouthing of the philister, rather than of the genuine accents of the philosopher. Hume and Smith and Bacon and Comte only did and could consider — all of them alike — the common world of facts before them from the common world of principles behind them. Nay, what if Smith, in especial, did test his facts by the principle of selfishness, did this testing deserve to be called deduction, and under that name be opposed to induction ? How results shall be expressed is not the same question as how shall they be acquired. But even granting the manner of statement in the one country to be different from that in the other, this difference will by no means support the weight Mr. Buckle would lay upon it. The order in which you present the propositions of your syllogism alters in no way the single knuckle of the syllogism itself. Induction itself is but a syllogism with a peculiar middle term ; and whether it be induction that is the name, or deduction, it is but one and the same mental energy that is the act. Kant, doubtless, would have been to Mr. Buckle the perfect model of deduction ; yet Kant attributed his own success to his adoption of the same method as that adopted by Galileo and Torricelli, by Stahl and Bacon ; and as for statement, it is the same import and in the same way acquired which we have now at the hands of Kant synthetically in the “*Kritik of Pure Reason*,” and again analytically in the “*Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysics*.” The author’s nationality is not more determinative in the case of the one work than in that of the other. Mr. Buckle is not too great a man to write a good deal of nonsense, and this of analytic and synthetic statement converted into inductive and deductive methods, the *a posteriori*, the *a priori*, etc., with such vast spiritual and national results, we conceive to be simply an example in point.

Be all that as it may, we are now prepared to turn to the main consideration of — Mr. Buckle at work, — Mr. Buckle on

the one hand generalizing the principles of mind from the facts of history, and on the other hand deductively applying them. We have already seen something of Mr. Buckle's state of mind on the first look at his quarry, — the quarry of history from which he is to hew — all — the palace of Aladdin! Certainly it is not by any means encouraging. Mr. Buckle is seen to look rather hopelessly into this quarry, to grumble a good deal at what he sees there, and not to know where he is to begin at it, or how he is to begin at it. Is the result to be but a mass of desultory remark in consequence now of involuntary floundering, and now of wilful leaps in an all impracticable chaos?

Luckily, however, the preliminary elimination of theology and metaphysics is there to suggest itself, and Mr. Buckle will begin with that. Now, it being Mr. Buckle's single object to demonstrate the movements of man in a similar necessary sequence to those of the movements of nature, theology and metaphysics will have no interest to him, but in so far as they interfere with that object; in so far, then, as it is supposed that there is a will, on the one hand, of God, and, on the other, of man, to disturb the nexus; in so far, also, as their method is not his method, and, consequently, to be exploded. If human movement is to be an independent whole, if it is to appear as an original system of spontaneous law, it must be relieved on the one hand of the wilful interference of God, and on the other of the wilful interference of man. The one concerns theology, the other metaphysics; or, as Mr. Buckle says himself, "The theory of predestination is founded on a theological hypothesis; that of free-will on a metaphysical hypothesis." In the same reference the very method of metaphysics must be proved a failure. Of free-will and predestination Mr. Buckle, in his big way, avers that they "are so suited to the average capacity of the human mind, that even at the present day," etc., "they have corrupted the sources of our knowledge, have given rise to religious sects whose mutual animosities have disturbed society, and too often embittered the relations of private life." One would expect, then, that against two such pernicious doctrines Mr. Buckle would see fit to bring forward such argument as would prove definitively remedial.

Nay, considering that if either be true, — if either God or

man can will a single antecedent,— his own special industry would be brought at once to the short issue of death in the birth, one would think that Mr. Buckle, aware of the vital necessity of this his first step, must have studied the general subject, as he might say himself, both “comprehensively” and “exhaustively,” must have convinced himself of the fallaciousness of both assumptions, and have only appeared before the public when provided with such counter-reasoning as would prove irrefutable. It is disappointing, therefore, to be able to find in Mr. Buckle nothing of this nature, but, on the contrary, only such language as would seem to demonstrate, on his part even, so to speak, *professional* ignorance here. Mr. Buckle, in fact, through *ore rotundo* blowing volume of verbiage after volume of verbiage to the amount of several pages, feels himself too great a philosopher and the subject too contemptible to pronounce upon it at all, and might have contented himself, much to our ease and his own, with the brief conclusion that “the more advanced European thinkers” opine, as he says, “that both doctrines are wrong.” All this, then, *is* disappointing, and all the more so that the call is only on “the average capacity of the human mind.”

But to look a little nearer, we may say, that, as regards predestination, we simply hear that it is a theological hypothesis; that St. Augustine gets it from the Manichæans, but that oddly again, nevertheless, the theologian borrows it from “necessary connection”; that there is “no good evidence” for it; that it is “incompatible with other notions supposed fundamental”; that, accordingly, it “must, in a scientific investigation, be regarded as a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond the province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either its truth or its falsehood”; and on “the absurdity,” etc., he bids us “see,” etc. ! This certainly is a high-voiced manner of settling a difficulty; but it is probably more satisfactory to the author himself than to his reflective reader. The “magnificent notion of one God” is an approbative phrase of Mr. Buckle here. Why did it not suggest to him his natural responsibilities in such a connection?

Mr. Buckle is scarcely less unsatisfactory on free-will. This doctrine “rests,” he tells us, “on the metaphysical dogma of

the supremacy of human consciousness," and then he proceeds thus : —

" Now the existence of this supreme jurisdiction, which is thus to set at defiance all the ordinary methods of reasoning, involves two assumptions : of which the first, though possibly true, has never been proved ; and the other is unquestionably false. These assumptions are, that there is an independent faculty called consciousness, and that the dictates of that faculty are infallible. But, in the first place, it is by no means certain that consciousness is a faculty ; and some of the ablest thinkers have been of opinion that it is merely a state or condition of the mind. Should this turn out to be the case, the argument falls to the ground ; since even if we admit that all the faculties of the mind, when completely exercised, are equally accurate, no one will make the same claim for every condition into which the mind itself may be casually thrown. However, waiving this objection, we may, in the second place, reply, that even if consciousness is a faculty, we have the testimony of all history to prove its extreme fallibility. All the great stages through which, in the progress of civilization, the human race has necessarily passed, have been characterized by certain mental peculiarities or convictions, which have left their impress upon the religion, the philosophy, and the morals of the age. Each of these convictions has been to one period a matter of faith, to another a matter for derision ; and yet it is impossible that all these products of consciousness can be true, because many of them contradict each other. . . . It is clear that the testimony of a man's consciousness is no proof of an opinion being true ; for, if it were so, then two propositions diametrically opposed to each other might both be equally accurate," etc., etc.

Human nature is weak, and it is difficult to resist the relief here just of a cry, — just of one long cry of amazement ! Bacon died in 1626, Descartes in 1650 ; since then there have been, on the Continent, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and in England Hobbes and Locke and Berkeley and Hume, — nay, in unbroken series up to this very day such teachers as Reid and Stewart and Brown and Hamilton, — yet in 1857 it was possible for one cultivated man to utter and for other cultivated men to receive — with perfect conviction in both cases — such extraordinary intimations. Nay, so peculiar is the position that he who shall demonstrate these intimations to be but as the stumblings of a child over and among the most elementary notions, — which is no more than the truth, — will inevitably

wear the appearance of presumption. In view simply of the authority claimed *by* — perhaps *for* — Mr. Buckle, this cannot be otherwise. Nevertheless, it is this claim that is now to be examined.

By reference, by quotation, and otherwise, Mr. Buckle intimates familiarity, on his part, with most of the philosophers and teachers mentioned. Of this, as concerns Brown, for example, there can certainly be no doubt; and still less as regards Descartes. The latter is to Mr. Buckle “the originator of that great system of metaphysics,” “the great reformer and liberator of the human intellect”; and, honored by copious quotation and constant reference, he receives, on the part of Mr. Buckle, the most fervid and enthusiastic, the most formal and direct, eulogy which the whole book contains. Mr. Buckle, then, perfectly knows both of you; and yet, O shades of Brown and Descartes! this is the way he understands your most characteristic doctrines, your most current expressions! “It is by no means certain,” he says, “that consciousness is a faculty; and some of the ablest thinkers have been of opinion that it is merely a state or condition of the mind!” One would like to have some idea of what strange phantom loomed before Mr. Buckle under the word “consciousness.” It was not a *faculty*; it was only a *state*, perhaps, or a *condition* of the mind! One wonders what sort of thing now a faculty was to Mr. Buckle. But did Mr. Buckle really not know such a triviality as this, that Brown introduced the phrase “state of mind” as a preferable general expression to all the usual ones, “function,” “affection,” “faculty,” etc.? and that, consequently, it is no impeachment to a faculty to call it a state or condition of the mind? Brown certainly conceived it a blunder to call consciousness — which, as such, underlies all faculties — only a particular faculty; but he would have looked strangely aghast had it been intimated to him that he held consciousness to be only a “state” or “condition” into which the mind might be “*casually thrown*”! Brown knew well that consciousness, call it what you may, state, faculty, law, is the essential principle of all exercise of mind whatsoever. Hamilton knew this no better, though he sought to elevate a special form into the infallibility of the universal consciousness. Kant, again, whom

Mr. Buckle expects us to believe he understands, what would his whole transcendental philosophy, — which Mr. Buckle carefully avoids jostling, — what would his whole transcendental philosophy, theoretical or practical, his whole *a priori* provision for the exercise of mind in perception, will, etc., be without the inviolability of consciousness? But why talk they? What is all modern philosophy, — and we need not confine ourselves to philosophy proper, — what is the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, to which surely Mr. Buckle would not have refused his homage, what is it but the *cultus* of consciousness? And Descartes began it! For his “doubt” would render problematical every tittle which the mind possesses and acknowledges, except only consciousness. I am conscious, said Descartes; that is a fact to which I am directly present; deny what I may, I cannot deny my consciousness. That is the first, the nearest fact; and to it all others must reduce themselves, or they are naught for me. Would they address themselves to me, they must address themselves to consciousness; for only so can they become present to me. What is the right of private judgment, too, but another name for the supremacy of consciousness? and is not that right the ground-principle of Mr. Buckle’s whole scheme? What but the right of private judgment is the very *liberty* for which he is so inflamed? A humiliating spectacle it is, then, rather, to watch Mr. Buckle cheerfully sawing off the mighty branch on which alone he is supported, on which alone he would know the world supported, — between himself and the tree!

A very difficult and uncertain matter is this of consciousness, thinks Mr. Buckle, but he, for his part, will be acute and diligent as usual; he will gather passages and settle it all in a note, as thus: —

“Mr. James Mill says that consciousness and belief are the same, and that great error has arisen from calling ‘consciousness a feeling distinct from all other feelings.’ According to Locke, ‘consciousness is a perception of what passes in a man’s own mind.’ Brown denies that consciousness is a faculty; and Sir W. Hamilton complains of ‘Reid’s degradation of consciousness into a special faculty.’ M. Cousin pronounces consciousness to be ‘*phénomène complexe*,’ and ‘*la condition nécessaire de l’intelligence*’; while a still later writer (Jobert) declares

that 'we have the consciousness of our consciousness; this is certain.' The statement in Alciphron is equally unsatisfactory; and what still further perplexes the question is the existence of what is now recognized as 'double consciousness.' See on this extraordinary phenomenon Elliotson's 'Physiology,' Mayo's 'Physiology,' Prichard's 'Treatise on Insanity,' Carpenter's 'Human Physiology.' "

This of consciousness, then, is a very ticklish business to Mr. Buckle, and he finds all writers on the subject — haw! — "equally unsatisfactory"! Yet "the dignity and supremacy of the human intellect," — that is his single principle! He styles Descartes, too, "the great reformer and liberator of the human intellect," attributes the accomplishment of all this reformation and liberation to the "method" of Descartes, and acknowledges that method to have rested "solely on the consciousness each man has of the operations of his own mind," seems never to tire, in fact, of evolving big-mouthed period after big-mouthed period about that "extraordinary confidence in the power of the human intellect which eminently characterizes Descartes, and has given to his philosophy that peculiar sublimity which distinguishes it from all other systems"; — all this, absolutely forgetting the equally big-mouthed contempt with which he had spoken of that "boasted faculty," consciousness!

There cannot be a doubt, all this time, but that Mr. Buckle means by consciousness, here in its bearing on free-will, only what the Germans call *unmittelbares Wissen*, and we *intuition*, or instinctive conviction; but the perception of this, far from diminishing, positively increases our perception as well of Mr. Buckle's entire relative ignorance, — the entire relative ignorance of the athlete that is to destroy metaphysic!

But suppose we observe now Mr. Buckle's argumentation in his own support: —

"Besides this, another view may be drawn from the common operations of ordinary life. Are we not in certain circumstances conscious of the existence of spectres and phantoms; and yet is it not generally admitted that such beings have no existence at all? Should it be attempted to refute this argument [no danger, Mr. Buckle, not a soul will try!] by saying that such consciousness is apparent, and not real, then I ask, What is it that judges between the consciousness which is

genuine and that which is spurious? If this boasted faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will not deceive us in others? If there is no security, the faculty is not trustworthy. If there is a security, then, whatever it may be, its existence shows the necessity for some authority to which consciousness is subordinate, and thus does away with that doctrine of the supremacy of consciousness, on which the advocates of free-will are compelled to construct the whole of their theory. Indeed, the uncertainty as to the existence of consciousness as an independent faculty, and the manner in which that faculty, if it exists, has contradicted its own suggestions, are two of the many reasons which have long since convinced me that metaphysics will never be raised to a science by the ordinary method of observing individual minds," etc.

These sentences may be taken as a type of the whole of Mr. Buckle.

Observe the *manner*! The expression is lucid to the bottom, and balanced to a point. But what is the worth of the expression, and how far is it to the bottom? By what arts, especially, is the balanced point effected? "If this boasted faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will not deceive us in others?" etc., etc. It is really worth while assuming solemnly a full suit of black for the enunciation of such — seesaw! If the horse will not drive with the snaffle, what security have we that it will drive with the curb? If the ship will not sail off a wind, what security have we that it will sail on one? If the dog will bite without a muzzle, what security have we that it will not bite with one? If the gun will explode when cocked, what security have we that it will not explode when uncocked? If stone will not serve for fuel, what security have we that it will serve for a house? Is it not ludicrous, all this humming on through such mere sound, tucking in, as instinctively suggested by memory, conventional balance after conventional balance of a clause, and swelling into the majesty of the inane itself? With what a superbly serious, with what a deeply convinced air do we not intimate that, after gravest *thought*, these are two of the *many* reasons which, etc.? Ah! *we* at least have studied these matters, — studied them according to those exhaustive and comprehensive methods which, though seldom successfully adopted, ought never to be neglected!

It would be idle to enlarge on the open secret of this verbiage ; but what now of the *matter* ? It is to be supposed the destruction of metaphysics, the destruction of free-will, through destruction of consciousness ; and all in the midst of such knowledge ! How could it be else than in the midst of knowledge absolute ? for it was necessary to destroy metaphysics and destroy free-will to make room for Mr. Buckle's very foundation. That foundation being, as we have seen, however, the right of private opinion and the supremacy of the human intellect, it was somewhat suicidal to include consciousness in the *destruenda*. Leave alone Brown, leave alone Descartes, Kant,— and him Mr. Buckle actually patronizes,— Kant exclaims that consciousness is the ultimate *punctum* to which we reduce all exercise of the understanding,— “Ja dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand selbst !” It is to be acknowledged, however, that all these men are easily blown aside by Mr. Buckle when he asks in his high way, “Are we not in certain circumstances conscious of the existence of spectres and phantoms ? ” *

In the midst of the discussion, Mr. Buckle does indeed introduce a little modification of his strictures on consciousness. “Consciousness,” he says, “is infallible as to the *fact* of its testimony, but fallible as to the truth.” But as readers, we hardly feel our position improved even so ; for he adds that the consideration of “truth” involves a “judgment,” and “the moment we do this, we introduce the element of fallibility : because consciousness and judgment put together cannot be always right, inasmuch as judgment is often wrong.” Having already given up our consciousness, we are asked now to give up our judgment ! It is peculiarly distressing ! For us certainly, but what of Mr. Buckle himself ? How is he ever to arrive anywhere with neither consciousness nor judgment ?

* That whole note of Mr. Buckle here about spectral phenomena and dreams — Plato, Cudworth, Broussais, Esquirol, Burdach, Berkeley, Diogenes, Laertius, who not — is so particularly cheering ! The amount of light it gives is so enormous, and accounts so easily for the trouble of the writing ! Then it is so interesting to know of Plato in the *Theætetus* that “the only conclusion to which this consummate thinker could arrive was, that whatever appears true to the individual mind is true for him, which, however,” we swell ourselves out to say, “is an evasion of the problem, not a solution of it !”

How one should like to know what faculty we are to attribute all these enormous results — the big book itself — to ! Then, after all, it is not for *its* faults that we are asked to give up consciousness : it is for the faults of quite another faculty ; it is for the faults of judgment ! O, “ if this boasted faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will not deceive us in others ” ? Alas for humanity that dare not trust its own judgment ! . But, doubtless, there are other “ faculties ” ?

Such deliverances as these of Mr. Buckle do not congrue, then, with what is called the technical knowledge of the subject. They do not stand alone, however, but are supported by others more or less akin. Here, for example, is a small instance, but perhaps a decided one. In his third chapter Mr. Buckle, in reference to an affirmation of Sir W. Hamilton that noncontingent truths “ have their converse absolutely incogitable,” remarks, not without the characteristic *spreading* of himself, “ but this learned writer does not mention how we are to know when anything is ‘ absolutely incogitable ’ ; that we cannot cogitate an idea, is certainly no proof of its being incogitable ; for it may be cogitated at some later period when knowledge is more advanced.” Fancy Mr. Buckle patiently seated watching the river of time till it brought down round squares, square triangles, or triangles with three right angles ! Ah ! *labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum* ! It was really worth Mr. Buckle’s while acquiring his enormous knowledge of Plato and Descartes and Kant, to say nothing at all of Locke and the rest, for such a result as that.

This by the by ; return we a moment longer to predestination and free-will. Holding the doctrine of necessity, Mr. Buckle belongs naturally to one side of the general antithesis ; but a *side* is altogether inconsistent with the comprehensiveness that would only judge and sentence from a magistral survey of the whole. In such circumstances, and with such internal conviction, Mr. Buckle is somewhat put to it for the preservation of the due middle. He falls on a little artifice, however. He cannot approach the antithesis *qua* antithesis, namely, seriously, that is, he can only approach it, as becomes him, with the patrician sniff ; but what then of necessity ? Why, necessity, we shall never mention, we shall induct predestination into its

place, and sniff as we please ! With only predestination and free-will before us, we can resume that perfect *aplomb* of ours, and perorate as authoritatively as we may desire about "so suited to the average capacity of the human mind that, even at the present day," etc., etc. It is not every reader who will recite this, and other such passages, to himself in the high tone of some righteously indignant, virtuous conjurer ! He ought, though.

This little artifice is clever, then, but does Mr. Buckle succeed in it ? Even here rather has he not immediately proceeded to baffle his own self ? Tracing the origin of the doctrine of predestination to St. Augustine and the Manichæans at one time, does he not refer it at another to necessary connection ? "In the second instance, the theologian taking up the doctrine of necessary connection recasts it into a religious shape !" But predestination so situated is empowered to call upon its primitive to share with it the usage which it receives ; and Mr. Buckle is bound to bring under the gong of his own peculiar vituperation his own polite necessity quite as much as the theologian's so barbarous election. Nay, he has let the theologian escape ; for, coming from necessary connection, predestination is no longer of a possible theological origin. Not but that this genesis of predestination is all the same a strange one. The metaphysician setting out, we saw, with chance arrives in the end at free-will, and this, as a *development* apparently, did not, so far, startle us. But it is otherwise with us as regards predestination where the tables are turned, and where, while barbarous chance yielded then to polite free-will, it is now polite necessity that must yield to barbarous predestination. The genesis is cross, then, and sufficiently perplexing.

In short, Mr. Buckle's lofty pretensions to reject both predestination and free-will are utterly untenable. As a necessitarian, he must take his place, and stand all consequences. The *de haut en bas* tone might have been well spared then ; and Mr. Buckle would probably have done himself greater justice had he omitted the *ruse* of a scapegoat at all, and formally discussed the whole metaphysical question known as liberty and necessity. Nay, is it so very reasonable and consistent so egregiously to despise predestination ? We have already done

homage to the "magnificent notion of one God," and we admit ourselves necessitarians. Why, then, evading, as said, our natural responsibilities, should we refuse to bring the two notions together? And why, with such superb disdain of "a barren hypothesis," wilfully reject a very legitimately reasoned inference? The universe being a system on necessity, that necessity — if there be a God — must and can only be named predestination. Either, then, Mr. Buckle's homage to the "magnificent notion of one God" implies but one of the phrases with which, by way of ornament, he so ostentatiously covers his capacious page, or the arbitrary resolution to sist reasoning then when it only pleases Mr. Buckle, is hardly to be reconciled with the pretensions of a philosopher.

If, indeed, we are to reject predestination because, being beyond the province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either its truth or its falsehood, are we a bit better placed as regards necessity? And this, besides, is the conclusion of Mr. Buckle's own school: if we maintain, as we must maintain, and do maintain, that we know only *phenomena*, and that we know of them no more than they themselves give us to know, then, on our own principles, any idea involving necessity is quite incompetent to us! Whatever we observe, namely, enables us to say *that* it is, but never that it *must* be as it is, and cannot be otherwise. But an aggregate of probabilities, though it reached up to Sirius, and back to Osiris, were all too inadequate premises for a conclusion that should contain necessity.

The result, so far, on the whole, seems to be this, that Mr. Buckle's one object being the reduction of the movements of man to the principle of necessity, he was bound, before he could move an inch from the spot, to study and definitively sift the whole subject named liberty and necessity. But of this on the part of Mr. Buckle — even of the indispensable knowledge of Kant in this connection — we have been unable to see any evidence.

In regard to this we have additional light from what Mr. Buckle is pleased to object to the method of metaphysics in general. This occurs in Mr. Buckle's third chapter, and it is really pleasing to observe the grand manner in which Mr. Buckle brings his procession to a halt in this emergency. In

consequence of the pretensions of metaphysicians, Mr. Buckle declares, with all that charming facility of conventional phrase so peculiar to himself, — a conventionality, nevertheless, that is not sense, but only, as it were, so much stereotyped sound, — that “it therefore becomes necessary to ascertain the value of their researches, to measure the extent of their resources, and, above all, to test the validity of that method which they always follow, and by which alone, as they assert, great truths can be elicited.” There is a great deal indicated as about to be done here, and were it done it would constitute a considerable work ; but it is really astonishing how easily Mr. Buckle and the school of Mr. Buckle content themselves with mere phrases, if, however empty, they are simply balanced enough. So sure, too, is Mr. Buckle that all the world is as he himself is, or so sure is he that it is only to his own he speaks, that it is quite comical to hear him deprecating the natural surprise at the tenets of metaphysicians, which he anticipates on the part of those “who are unversed in these matters,” or benevolently intimating that the difficulty to which he alludes, “not being met with in any other pursuit, seems to have escaped the attention of those who are unacquainted with metaphysical controversies.” It is only his own, surely, who can be so “unversed” and so “unacquainted” ; and it is very good of Mr. Buckle to come to the help of their deficiencies, as well as to indicate a difficulty which had escaped their attention ; though attention at all on the part of the “unversed” and the “unacquainted” was hardly to have been expected. In fact, it is only polite of Mr. Buckle to talk of attention in any such circumstances. The difficulty alluded to, we may mention, lies simply in this, that there is self-consciousness. What, in explanation of the universe, is perhaps the *key*, Mr. Buckle views as the single chasm of disjunction. The nature of self-consciousness it is that has escaped the attention ; “not of the acquainted,” no ! but, as seems gratuitously to surprise Mr. Buckle, of the “unacquainted” ! How did the “unacquainted” come to reveal to Mr. Buckle the state of their attention at all ? It is pleasant, no doubt, to float at the will of the wave, but it is at least idle ; nor can else be said for Mr. Buckle when he floats at will of the alternating clause. But is it so great a

difficulty in the examining of self-consciousness that in it subject and object are one? When we study a crystal, it remains at the last foreign to us, and we have only got at it from the outside. But were that crystal conscious, and did it observe and know its own self, would it not arrive at knowledge infinitely more intimate than ours? Perhaps, then, what Mr. Buckle views as obstructive is really promotive of knowledge. At all events it seems reasonable to suppose the near more easily known than the remote, and it is mind that is precisely *next* to us. But this whole difficulty of Mr. Buckle is but a word, and hardly deserves another.

In further objection to metaphysic, Mr. Buckle adduces the usual garbled citation from Kant, that it has made no progress, and can hardly be said to exist. This, however, is a presumption on our ignorance to the last degree impertinent. For — far from being necessitated to point out that Kant's view of metaphysic, past, present, and future, is expressed by him, not doubtfully, not defectively, not rarely, but with a repetition of precision and amplitude, frequent, if not *ad nauseam*, at least to superfluity and fatigue — all that we have to do is to add to the passage garbled in quotation the failing phrase, that “metaphysic is older than all the other sciences, and would remain if the whole of them were bodily swallowed up in the maw of an all-destroying barbarism.”

We cannot subscribe, either, to the objection that metaphysic is limited to “what can be generalized from the facts of individual consciousness.” We have already pointed out, indeed, that such limit need not be a disadvantage. Of all sums of knowledge there is not one more accurate and complete than that of anatomy, and not some individual bodies, but one individual body, is there enough. Still, restriction to the individual is not a limit to metaphysics. Physics are no more to the movements of nature than metaphysics are to the movements of man. As there is no restriction in the former to what has been witnessed only in such and such a place, at such and such a time, by such and such an observer, etc., so, in the latter, we are equally allowed “to cover the whole field.” History, poetry, eloquence, religion, law, science, — all that man has done, everything that results from the movements of man, —

we are allowed to study for the metaphysical result. That is just what metaphysic is,—the ultimate sifting and searching of all the other sciences ; and as they move, so it ; nor will its completion precede their completion. It is true that for the brief space in Scotland from Reid to Hamilton, and for the briefer present moment in England under Mr. Mill for chief, metaphysic was and is tantamount to little more than psychology. But that is no reason why we should forget what metaphysic was to the magistral philosophers of all the countries and of all the ages,—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel. *Καὶ ἔστι τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ πάντων δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν.* Nay, even if we suppose Reid right, it is not so certain that Mr. Buckle is not wrong. It is not so certain that even then metaphysic has been confined to psychology and the study of an individual mind. What Reid proceeds upon is really an induction, however miscellaneous ; and it is really as such induction that it is passed on to Stewart and Brown. More than that, Reid pretends that he has only followed Bacon here, as Hume, indeed, pretended to the same before him, and Kant after him. It is possible, in a word, that Mr. Buckle has only been precipitate, and that the German philosophers have already accomplished all that he only talks of accomplishing, and in a manner the perfection and completeness of which never occurred to him even in a dream. It is certain, at all events, that these Germans have already endeavored scientifically to generalize the movements of man, and to group them round principles and a single principle. Fancy Mr. Buckle becoming aware that his work has been already done ! Not but that these Germans would have found it difficult enough to generalize their results out of the sieges, battles, progresses, processions, and what not of history, or even if, with Mr. Buckle, they had had to read, for these, standing armies, gunpowder, political economy, steam, etc. No element of necessity, possibly, could have seemed to rise to them out of these things, and they might have despaired, so, of that necessary first to a necessary second and a necessary last constitutive of the “chain” Mr. Buckle has so prodigally promised us.

Till Mr. Buckle knew all that, it certainly was not competent to him to assert that metaphysicians had made “no dis-

coveries." Perhaps here, in regard to the laws of association, it is only Mr. Buckle who can appreciate the fact he assures us of, that they are capable of historical verification. The laws of association and their historical verification, — what a loss it is that Mr. Buckle did not enable us to understand that! In the same way it is difficult to feel at home with Mr. Buckle when he tells us of metaphysicians, that, "at the present moment, their systems, so far from approximating towards truth, are diverging from each other with a velocity which seems to be accelerated by the progress of knowledge." Very far from that, we are asked to believe in these days that it has been expressly proved that even the whole history of philosophy constitutes but a single system and on a single principle; that all philosophical opinions have been but moments in a single scientific whole. Mr. Buckle recommends every theologian and metaphysician to get by heart this sentence, "That we have first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see." We should not wonder if Mr. Buckle's readers asserted the former clause of him, and the latter of themselves.

Why should these reproaches be levelled specially at metaphysics? Are there not disputes and differences in all the fields of inquiry, and would it not be easy one-sidedly to exaggerate them into hopelessness? And what is the real bearing of the censure, — "much movement but little progress"? What sort of progress is expected? Something tangible, lighthouses perhaps? But is the inner outer, then, though in the end the latter is but the result of the former? Above all, after the Germans, is it now that these reproaches are in place? No progress! Perhaps in its own department the progress has only been too rapid, though we have only to bless it for the fact that even in all the positive sciences Germany is now by far the first country in the world. There is really a vast deal to be said here of what, in Germany, the progress of metaphysic (and, consequently of science) has been, as well as of what a hopeless sort of thing this shallow historical chaos of the well-meaning Mr. Buckle looks beside it. Room fails, however. We will only illustrate how little prepared Mr. Buckle was to pronounce on all this by an example or two of the way he understands Kant.

Mr. Buckle's use of such words as *transcendent*, *empirical*, etc., and as in reference to Kant, are flagrant instances in point; but we shall pass these for the most part, and confine ourselves on the whole to his deliverances in the two notes with which he terminates his — important first and third chapters!

In the latter of these Mr. Buckle refers to what he considers Kant's apology for that great difficulty about which he (Mr. Buckle) is so much concerned as having "escaped" the "unacquainted," the fact of self-consciousness, or, simply, of self, a fact that involves the duplicity of subject and object in one act. This difficulty, as we have hinted, may be viewed as a facility. But be that as it may, it is thus that Mr. Buckle refers to Kant's words here: —

"In regard to one of the difficulties stated in this chapter as impeding metaphysicians, it is only just to quote the remarks of Kant: 'Wie aber das Ich, der ich denke, von dem Ich, das sich selbst anschaut, unterschieden (indem ich mir noch andere Anschauungsart wenigstens als möglich vorstellen kann) und doch mit diesem letzteren als dasselbe Subject einerlei sei, wie ich also sagen könne: Ich als Intelligenz und denkend Subject, erkenne mich selbst als gedachtes Object, so fern ich mir noch über das in der Anschauung gegeben bin, nur, gleich andern Phänomenen, nicht wie ich vor dem Verstande bin, sondern wie ich mir erscheine, hat nicht mehr auch nicht weniger Schwierigkeit bei sich, als wie ich mir selbst überhaupt ein Object und zwar der Anschauung und innerer Wahrnehmung sein könne.' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in *Kant's Werke*, Vol. II. p. 144.) I am very willing to let the question rest on this; for to me it appears that both cases are not only equally difficult, but, in the present state of our knowledge, are equally impossible."

In Rosenkranz's edition the above passage will be found at page 749 of Vol. II.; of course, *denkend* should be *denkendes*.

Now, it is to be understood, in the first place, that Kant here has not the slightest thought of Mr. Buckle's difficulty; but has something in his eye that constitutes a difficulty of a far other and more serious nature. What Kant has before him here is precisely that over which M. Cousin has also so signally stumbled; and it ought to be a lesson to all secondary people to be very careful as to permitting themselves the luxury of

any *de haut en bas* rebuke of this primary of the moment. Kant, in fact, is speaking of this, that if, on the one side, I know the inner (myself) as I know the outer, only through sense, phenomenally, or as appears, and if, on the other side, I know the inner (myself) as the logical "I think," the simple I, without perceivable constitutive complex, — how these two are one, or how the bare I of the intellectual "I think" and the I of sensuous affection are one and the same, — that this has no more and no less difficulty than how I can be an object (even sensuously if you like) to myself at all. The passage is certainly difficult, but if the reader will only put the three words *noch über das* into brackets, all difficulty will probably at once disappear, and he will then see that Kant is simply saying that, how the intellectual *ego* and the sensuous *ego* should distinguish and yet identify themselves, is at least as easy as how I can be an object to myself at all. In fact, express it as he may, Kant only wants to say here that his theory of consciousness knowing itself phenomenally, is no more and no less difficult than the common admission of consciousness knowing itself at all. We may refer, in passing to this, that the logical or intellectual *ego*, the bare "'t is I that am so thinking," is the I Am that threw Coleridge into the Jewish Temple and the middle of an Oriental opium dream. To repeat, Kant then says: "How the *intellectual* I (that only knows intellectually or logically the bare fact *that* it is), — how this I is distinguished from, yet identical with, the *perceptive* I (perceptive as under inner affection and so knowing *how* it is), moreover, how then (as regards the latter question, my *perceivability*, my sensuous state, my *how* I am) I can know myself, not as I am to the understanding (to which I am only the I of the 'I think'), but just like all other phenomena, simply as I appear to (inner) sense, — all this has no more and no less difficulty than how I can be to myself an object at all, an object that is of perception, of internal perception." And all this is no more than that, knowing the *what* (the states) of myself only sensuously, I so far know myself only phenomenally and as I appear, let it be as it may with the I of the "I think" (or the 't is I that am here and now so thinking) that intellectually accompanies all my experiences whatsoever (which I, however, is

only said *bare I*). In short, the difficulty before Kant's mind is merely this : people suppose that, being conscious of themselves, they know themselves directly ; whereas I want to tell them that, knowing themselves (in their constitutive matter, or states, namely) only *perceptively*, or through sense, they also know themselves, like all other things, only phenomenally, or not as they are, but as they appear ; and I want likewise to tell them that my way is as easy as their way. Kant only calls here on common experience to admit that how we should know ourselves phenomenally is not more difficult than how we should know ourselves at all ; and the argument is, if you feel no difficulty in the one case, you ought to feel none in the other. In the passage quoted by Mr. Buckle, Kant, then, is simply employed on his own peculiar theory of an inner sense ; but what Mr. Buckle wishes us to believe him employed on is the rescue of the metaphysician from the difficulty with which he (Mr. Buckle) reproaches him, — a difficulty which we venture to say never occurred to Kant to discuss. This very passage, indeed, would prove him not even to have entertained it ; for he says *there is no difficulty in your way*, and there should be as little in mine.

My way, that is, is that we know ourselves phenomenally, and yours that we know ourselves at all. “I know myself,” let us say : Mr. Buckle admits this, but asserts such knowledge to lie under the disadvantage of the mind being at once “instrument” and “material” in it. “I know myself” : Kant remarks, Yes, phenomenally, and it is not more difficult that you know yourself phenomenally than that you know yourself at all. The proposition, then, Mental knowledge is burdened with the difficulty that the two sides of it, subject and object, are one, is not this other proposition, Phenomenal self-knowledge is not more and not less difficult than self-knowledge at all. There is not the slightest attempt, on the part of Kant, to fence with the difficulty of Mr. Buckle. That Kant should say mental knowledge is phenomenal knowledge, cannot be represented as even touching this difficulty ; for all other knowledge — physical as well — is to Kant phenomenal knowledge ; and whether mental knowledge be called phenomenal or whether it be called noumenal, or whatever you like, it is still a knowl-

edge where *self* is at once *knowing* and *knower*; and this last fact is the single difficulty of Mr. Buckle.

What faith, then, can we accord Mr. Buckle in his undertaking as against metaphysic, when we find him attempting to support himself by the pillar merely of some detached passage that is plainly there only through the hap-hazard of accidental reading? But observe now what Mr. Buckle says in regard to this his wholly irrelevant quotation, "It is only just to quote the remarks of Kant." Is not Mr. Buckle magnanimous? He has completely demolished a doctrine; but he relents to allow the best word of its best friend to be heard in its favor! Nay, with his very grandest air of benevolent concession, Mr. Buckle declares, "I am very willing to let the question rest on this!" What a comfort to the metaphysician must not this large-hearted liberal allowance of Mr. Buckle be! Mr. Buckle is very willing to let the question of the difficulty of self-knowledge in that it is *self*-knowledge rest on the question of the difficulty of phenomenal self-knowledge in that it is *phenomenal*! "I am very willing to let the question rest on this; for to me it appears that both cases are not only equally difficult, but, in the present state of our knowledge, are equally impossible." What a happiness it is that Mr. Buckle should be so gentle with Kant, the whole thing being left to *his* authority! But, alas! "in the present state of our knowledge," "both" cases before Kant — phenomenal self-knowledge and self-knowledge at all — are definitively pronounced, by Mr. Buckle, not only "equally difficult," but "equally impossible!" The disconsolate metaphysicians may well gather traps, and shut up their boxes now, muttering, no doubt: That confounded "state of our knowledge"! it kept us a moment ago from thinking square rounds and round squares, and now it makes it impossible for us to know even our own selves, noumenally *or* phenomenally; in the present state of our knowledge, self-knowledge at all, self-consciousness at all, is quite impossible!

This, however, is not the only unsatisfactory relation in which Mr. Buckle appears towards Kant. Sundry passages in his first chapter, which concern the views of the same philosopher with reference to free-will and necessity, are equally unsatisfactory. For example, a free-will can to Mr. Buckle

seemingly be only such as is independent of motives, and this view Mr. Buckle appears to conceive as identical with that of Kant. It is perfectly certain, nevertheless, that Kant never for a moment supposed that the will, though free, was independent of motives. Free-will with Kant stands on a very different basis. Mr. Buckle, for his part, believes that all actions result from motives, these from antecedents; and, were we acquainted with these last and their laws, "we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results." Mr. Buckle, probably indeed, found Kant to have preceded him in almost these very words; for the following passage is from Kant himself: "Could we explore to the very grounds all the phenomena of man's volition, there would be discovered no single human action which we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessitated by its antecedent conditions." * This, certainly, is *one half* of the doctrine of Kant, and it corresponds so exactly with Mr. Buckle's *whole* doctrine that it is no wonder this latter should be astonished there is any *other half* to speak of. Mr. Buckle, accordingly, refers to Kant's remarkable attempt to evade the view conveyed by the above words, and promises to add in a note all the passages he can find in Kant relative to this peculiar double doctrine of his. The note promised contains a few passages from the "Kritik of Pure Reason" and the "Metaphysic of Morals," which really express, to a certain extent, the special doctrine of Kant; but they are all too inadequate to do the subject justice. But this was a subject demanding, surely, if any, the most ample justice. If, despite his acquiescence in a necessary natural mechanism, which carries man also in its web, Kant really believed that he could likewise equally acquiesce in the certainty of human free-will, it was assuredly not Mr. Buckle's duty to slur over this latter part, but to meet it and either refute it or demonstrate its inapplicability to his own doctrine. This, too, not because of the half-dozen passages which Mr. Buckle has collected, but because of the long, complete, continuous, express discussion; because, in short, of Kant's whole

* Kant is, nevertheless, wrong here: a vast number of our actions are contingent on what lies nearest, or on the result of mere toss-up. It is improper to call these calculable phenomena of volition.

practical system. It is quite absurd, then, to call this — a discussion so ample, so direct, so unwithholding, so anxious and conscientious — an “attempt to evade.” The idea of evading never occurred to Kant. To him the fact of moral free-will is as absolutely certain as that of physical necessity, and it fell to his precise function as a philosopher to resolve the resultant antinomy. This resolution, or solution, he conceived himself to have discovered, and he cannot find breadth enough for its elaboration in either of his first two great *Kritiken*. It is a perversion of the doctrine of Kant, then, to state his adhesion to natural necessity without stating at the same time his no less firm adhesion to moral free-will *and* — the solution that was to act as conciliating copula between both. Until Mr. Buckle had mastered all this material, he was in no condition to bury free-will beneath necessity ; and until he did find himself in such condition, any forward step in his general object could only prove precipitate, premature, and futile. In the note spoken of, we find these closing remarks of Mr. Buckle’s : —

“These passages prove that Kant saw that the phenomenal reality of free-will is an indefensible doctrine ; and as the present work is an investigation of the laws of phenomena, his transcendental philosophy does not affect my conclusions. According to Kant’s view (and with which I am inclined to agree) the ordinary metaphysical and theological treatment of this dark problem is purely empirical, and therefore has no value. The denial of the supremacy of consciousness follows as a natural consequence, and is the result of the Kantian philosophy, and not, as is often said, the base of it.”

We remark, first, that as to what *is* the base of the Kantian philosophy, this does not depend on what is *said*, whether often or not often. As regards the fundamental principle of Kant’s system in all its branches, we are not in the slightest permitted to doubt. In the theoretic branch it is pure apperception, or our original self-consciousness. In the practical or moral branch, it is the same consciousness in presence of the law of its own freedom. Even in the *Kritik of Judgment* the base is constituted by a spontaneity again of consciousness. In short, had Mr. Buckle possessed an inkling of the truth here, it would as soon have occurred to him to call Newton a follower of Ptolemy, as to insinuate that Kant did not found all on, but

on the contrary, actually denied, the supremacy of consciousness. That Mr. Buckle should be so suicidally eager to saw off the whole of his own support in this world, we shall not allow to disturb us now. But to place Kant in the same category is about the most complete self-conviction of ignorance that has ever yet been perpetrated by mortal. Observe, too, the accessaries of the perpetration, the puff of self-importance, the smile of easy strength over a disconcerted crowd; "the denial of the supremacy of consciousness follows as a natural consequence, and is the result of the Kantian philosophy, and not, as is often said, the base of it." Surely the *puff* can be actually heard here,—the puff of superior penetration that is only, however, the blunder of a school-boy's conceit. Mr. Buckle has manipulated the leaves of the books of Kant, as he manipulated the leaves of those of others. We can see here, too, how a man may just hug himself on his own exposure of his own self. In the whole passage, indeed, there is nothing else visible. "According to Kant's view, and with which I am inclined to agree!" How natural must not that enormous sufficiency be to Mr. Buckle; it is positively generous of him to patronize Kant! But in regard to what does he agree with Kant? That so and so is "empirical," "and therefore has no value!" To know Kant, and yet to attribute "empirical" to him (who uses it on every page) as here used! Or to describe Kant as believing something to be "empirical," "and therefore of no value!" Of course, as we all know, *empirical* has but one sense to Mr. Buckle and the whole school of the Revulsion; but, as we all know, too, it is a very different sense the Germans attach to it.

But to go higher in the quotation, we find Mr. Buckle saying, "These passages prove that Kant saw that the phenomenal reality of free-will is an indefensible doctrine; and as the present work is an investigation of the laws of phenomena, his transcendental philosophy does not affect my conclusions." And Mr. Buckle's eye twinkles. For, in saying "my object being only phenomena, Kant's transcendental philosophy does not affect me," he feels that he has dexterously turned the flank of the whole transcendental philosophy, and left it behind him, while triumphantly carrying off, at the same time,

the whole authority of Kant in his front? It is a pity to quench the twinkle; but the truth just is, that the whole transcendental army, turning on a pivot, lies boldly before Mr. Buckle again, for what is transcendental is but part and parcel of the phenomena! Nay, only in what is transcendental is it possible to find — Mr. Buckle's scope — these same "laws" of the "phenomena." When Mr. Buckle, then, professes not to consult the transcendental philosophy, because his object is phenomena, it is as if we heard James Ferguson declining to consult the *Principia* of Newton,* on a plea of investigating the movements of the stars!

On the whole, then, Mr. Buckle must be pronounced very far from satisfactory as regards any "exhaustive and comprehensive" discussion of the subject of free-will, etc., and equally so with reference to the knowledge he displays, whether of metaphysics in general or of metaphysicians in particular. We have seen predestination lugged in to cover necessity, and then turned out again, we may boldly say, simply at Mr. Buckle's good pleasure. And as for free-will, we have seen Mr. Buckle excising from beneath it (*and his own self*) consciousness! and that, too, in a most ludicrous confusion of consciousness, conscience, faculties, states of mind, etc., etc. Nay, we "omitted to observe" that the pretensions of Mr. Buckle could not consistently use such an argument as this: "It is clear that the testimony of a man's consciousness is no proof of an opinion being true; for, if it were so, then two propositions diametrically opposed to each other might both be equally accurate." Such an argument comes oddly from a student of metaphysics with the Antinomies before his eyes, or the simple fact at once of the *finite* and the *infinite* divisibility of matter. In a word, the two questions of chance and predestination, or of free-will and necessity, were, for resolution, pre-

* Mr. Buckle had already told us that "transcendental laws of the reason" are "laws which are removed from the domain of experience, and cannot be verified by observation." How much this contrasts with the truth will be readily understood when we know that *all* Kant's transcendental principles have *no* object *whatever* but to render experience possible, almost to create experience, and that consequently they *can* be verified by observation. And Mr. Buckle's pretensions in Kant's regard, are not less than in that of every other!

liminaries absolutely crucial in regard to Mr. Buckle's whole enterprise, and he has only attempted, in the midst of the strangest ignorance, summarily to truncate them. They remain behind, then, only like outflanked forts that, as it were, grimly smiling, await his return. Consciousness, his own support, and the support of the whole world, is to be withdrawn by these one or two hap-hazard school-boy crudities ! Such an exploit was conclusive beforehand as to how he would show when examining metaphysics in general,—an inquiry *also* crucial in regard to his whole future. Metaphysics, too, it seems, are to slink from the field, cowering before the eyes of Mr. Buckle, while he simply murmurs to them “ideas or sensations.” If you would go to Australia, you must double the cape *either* of Hope *or* of Horn ; that is, to go to Australia is impossible ! We know that this illustration is utterly stupid ; but it will be difficult to show that Mr. Buckle's proceedings deserve a better one. When we look back, indeed, on all that lies behind us, it is with something broader than a smile that we read his characteristic summing up : “ This, unless I am greatly mistaken, is the view which must be held by every man whose mind is unbiassed by system, and who forms his opinions according to the evidence actually before him ! ” This is Mr. Buckle's definition for the man who starting with the two or three prejudices of the *Aufklärung* desultorily reads in search of supports for these, as the *non plus ultra* of ultimate and definitive *enlightenment*.

J. H. STIRLING.